L’instrument anti-coercition. Première analyse du Règlement relatif à la protection de l’Union et de ses États membres contre la coercition économique

Culot, Henri [UCL]

Le Règlement (UE) 2023/2675 ajoute à l’arsenal commercial de l’Union européenne un « instrument anti-coercition », pour lui permettre de réagir à des actes de coercition économique commis par des États tiers contre l’Union et ses États membres, éventuellement par l’intermédiaire des entreprises qui y sont établies. Cet article présente les objectifs poursuivis par le Règlement et les dangers auxquels on a dû penser lors de son élaboration. Il rappelle que le Règlement n’est pas une initiative isolée, mais que d’autres instruments existent déjà au sein de l’ordre juridique de l’Union pour réagir contre des actes agressifs en matière économique. L’article présente ensuite les principales dispositions du Règlement avant de discuter brièvement les questions juridiques qu’il pose en droit international et en droit de l’OMC, pour terminer par l’évocation de questions touchant davantage aux principes et à l’évolution de la position de l’UE face à la mondialisation.

(eng) Regulation (EU) 2023/2675 on the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries adds an “anti-coercion instrument” to the European Union’s trade arsenal, enabling it to react to acts of economic coercion committed against the Union and its Member States, possibly through the intermediary of companies established there. This Regulation is one indication, among others, of a change in the EU’s attitude to economic globalisation and free trade. Without abandoning its ideals, the EU is adopting a less naïve attitude towards the major economic powers that are both its partners and its rivals. This article sets out the objectives of the Regulation and the dangers that had to be considered when it was drawn up. It points out that the Regulation is not an isolated initiative, but that other instruments already exist within the Union’s legal order to react against aggressive acts in economic matters. The article then presents the main provisions of the Anti-Coercion Regulation, discussing the definition it adopts of economic coercion, which also defines its scope, the procedure to be followed in determining the existence of coercion and the response to be addressed (which also raises the question of the division of competences between EU bodies in this area), the choice of response measures, respect for proportionality in the response to coercion, and the mechanisms established to prevent, if possible, an escalation of sanctions. The article then looks at the difficulties that the Regulation may pose in terms of public international law, in particular the law of countermeasures, and WTO law, in particular the exclusivity that the WTO would like to see recognised for its dispute settlement mechanism and the ban on unilateralism that it intends to impose. Finally, we examine a number of issues that relate to the principles and the evolution of the EU’s position on globalisation. The Anti-Coercion Regulation represents a shift towards unilateralism, although its scope should not be exaggerated. It also implies, to a certain extent, abandoning the isolation of economic issues from geopolitical ones. Certain weaknesses are also addressed. The Regulation is based on deterrence, but the text reveals a reluctance to implement it. Nor does it address issues of redistribution, i.e. compensation for victims of coercion and response measures and the contribution of potential beneficiaries of both. Finally, the problem of moral hazard is also at the heart of the Regulation, which must both strengthen European solidarity and prevent that the protection it offers be used to adopt imprudent behaviour.