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Sincere and strategic voters in a model of proportional representation

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De Sinopoli, Francesco Iannantuoni, Giovanna

In this paper we analyze a model of proportional representation that allows for both sincere and strategic voting. We prove that strategic voters vote only for the extreme parties in any equilibrium, if the electorate is large. Moreover, we show that there is an effect of sincere voters' behavior on the equilibrium outcome, for which strategic voters cannot fully adjust.

Document type Document de travail (Working Paper)
Access type Accès libre
Publication date 2001
Collection CORE Discussion Papers - 2001/29
Affiliation UCL - CORE - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics
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Bibliographic reference De Sinopoli, Francesco ; Iannantuoni, Giovanna. Sincere and strategic voters in a model of proportional representation. CORE Discussion Papers ; 2001/29 (2001)
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/4183