Context While there is now genuine interest in the idea of basic income to inspire welfare reform in developed welfare states, there is still a large gap between wish and reality. Not only has BI never been implemented at scale, concrete BI policy proposals take many different forms, vary in goals, coverage, benefit levels, entitlement conditions, and implementation trajectories Objectives The main objective of the BABEL project is to shed more empirical light on the redistributive, budgetary, and employment consequences of a variety of BI proposals, and to investigate the extent to which these proposal are politically feasible. It is our assumption that a BI proposal can only inspire real welfare reform in Belgium and beyond if it (1) is likely to garner sufficient support by the general public and by the social partners; (2) leads to better outcomes in terms of poverty reduction at a given budgetary cost; and (3) does not negatively affect employment and encourage idleness. Conclusions The findings suggest that a BI would not lead to a substantial drop in paid employment. However, there is socioeconomic heterogeneity, and increasing gender gaps in paid employment can be expected. All this, however, comes with an important caveat: design matters, and depending on the generosity of BI, whether it is truly universal or not, and how it is financed, the labour market effects are likely to be stronger or non-existent. A BI is no silver bullet to reduce poverty. The results show that a partial BI scheme at relatively low benefit levels that complements rather than replaces existing systems seems to be a more feasible and cost-efficient way to address poverty. A full BI set at the poverty line would significantly reduce poverty in absolute terms but at the same time also require a budget equivalent to nearly 25% of GDP. Next to the cost-poverty reduction trade-off, there is also a trade-off between social desirability and political feasibility. Tax advantages in Belgium are heavily middle-class biased and the progressive nature of our tax system means that tax increases proportionally impact the highest income quintiles the most. Financing a BI that effectively reduces poverty through the tax system would imply a redistribution of resources from higher to lower incomes. This, however, would affect popular support for BI. The results show that lower-income and less-educated individuals tend to favor generous BI models, while higher educated and higher income individuals are less likely to support a generous BI. Importantly, a BI that seems to undermine societal norms of reciprocity is least likely to be perceived as legitimate by the public at large. However, the legitimacy of a policy proposal not only stems from public support, but also requires political support from gatekeepers, in this case political parties and trade unions. The results demonstrate that political parties are highly divided among ideological lines on BI, and the trade unions are opposed, rooted in their institutional role within the Belgian welfare state.
