Meroni-doctrine and the delegation of powers to EU agencies

Bauerschmidt, Jonathan [UCL]

The Banking Union led to a proliferation of EU agencies to effectively supervise and regulate financial markets. Agencies allow to pool expert knowledge in order to outsource certain task and de-politicise complex decision-making procedures. At the same time, this delegation of powers creates tension with the long standing case-law on EU agencies. In contrast to some national constitutions, the Treaties do not explicitly address the possibilities and limitations for delegating powers to agencies. The relevant rules rather result from a series of judgments that go back to the beginning of European integration. Since the eponymous Meroni judgment of 1958 the ensuing case-law is collectively called the Meroni-doctrine. It deals with the interrelated questions of what powers can be delegated to an agency, how autonomously such an agency may act and which of oversight from Union institutions is necessary.