Wittgenstein, Meaning and Action

The aim of this paper is to shed light on the relation between meaning and action in Wittgenstein. More specifically it aims at understanding in what way meaning is linked to what we do. The issue raises two re-lated difficulties: (1) What is the difference between acting and follow-ing a rule (of meaning), if the rule can only be described from within a practice? (2) If what we do is supposed to be the only measure of meaning, how to avoid the threat of idealism (i.e. of failing to reach reality with language)? Going back first to the issue of rule-following, I support the claim that it makes no sense to try to ground or justify the rule outside of its application. This first discussion leads me to question the capacity of language to reach outside itself and the (in)commensurability of systems of thought. I argue with Elizabeth Anscombe that if the existence of rules depends on the existence of humans (a position she calls ‘partial idealism’), this does not prevent meaning from reaching reality and agreement in judgement.