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A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems

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Maniquet, François [UCL]

A set of agents stand to receive a service. No two agents can be served simultaneously. A Queue has been organized, and agents having to wait should receive monetary compensations. We characterize the rule assigning positions in the queue and compensations corresponding to the payoffs recommended by the Shapley value of the associated cooperative game.

Document type Article de périodique (Journal article)
Publication date 2003
Language Anglais
Journal information "Journal of Economic Theory" - Vol. 109, no. 1, p. 90-103 (Mars 2003)
Peer reviewed yes
Publisher Academic Press (San Diego, USA)
issn 0022-0531
Publication status Publié
Affiliation UCL - EUEN/CORE - Center for operations research and econometrics
Keywords Game theory ; Economic models
Links
Bibliographic reference Maniquet, François. A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems. In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 109, no. 1, p. 90-103 (Mars 2003)
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/23406