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Twenty years of principal-agent research in EU politics: how to cope with complexity?

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Delreux, Tom [UCL] Adriaensen, Johan [Maastricht University]

In the 20 years after its introduction, the principal-agent model has seen increasing use to study political processes in virtually all policy domains in which the EU is active. Relaxing the strict assumptions that guided the original economic applications has greatly widened the scope for potential applications. This very phenomenon has also created an existential challenge to the model’s contemporary use, which is combining the reductionist aims of the model (from which it derives its strength) with the complex empirical settings to which it is increasingly applied. To facilitate this balancing exercise, we propose a two-step approach to principal-agent analysis, in which the mapping of the principal-agent proof relation is separated from the effective analysis that examines the reasons, modalities and consequences of delegation and control in the EU. In doing so, we show how the principal-agent model can continue to provide new insights at the various stages of the research process.

Document type Article de périodique (Journal article) – Article de recherche
Access type Accès restreint
Publication date 2018
Language Anglais
Journal information "European Political Science" - Vol. 17, no.2, p. 275 (2018)
Peer reviewed yes
Publisher Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. (Basingstoke)
issn 1680-4333
e-issn 1682-0983
Publication status Publié
Affiliation UCL - SSH/SPLE - Institut de sciences politiques Louvain-Europe
Keywords principal-agent ; control ; discretion ; rational choice institutionalism ; agency ; European Union ; European integration
Links
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Bibliographic reference Delreux, Tom ; Adriaensen, Johan. Twenty years of principal-agent research in EU politics: how to cope with complexity?. In: European Political Science, Vol. 17, no.2, p. 275 (2018)
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/198656