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Conclusion. Opportunities and Challenges for the Principal–Agent Model in Studying the European Union

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Adriaensen, Johan [Maastricht University] Delreux, Tom [UCL]

This chapter examines whether the principal–agent model will mature by accommodating the new empirical reality or whether it will become outdated as the practical challenges narrow the researcher’s focus to the simplest of hierarchical relations. We address this question by covering the three main components of the research process. We distinguish (1) the formulation of research questions; (2) the contribution one can deliver to the existing literature; and (3) the required methodology. Each section questions the opportunities that are to be gleaned from applying the principal–agent model to an ever-more complex setting, and confronts it with practical challenges that may emerge in the research process. In so doing, we derive guidelines that may help to ensure the contemporary relevance of the principal–agent model.

Document type Contribution à ouvrage collectif (Book Chapter) – Chapitre
Access type Accès restreint
Publication date 2017
Language Anglais
Host document Delreux Tom & Adriaensen Johan ; "The Principal Agent Model and the European Union"- p. 283-299 (ISBN : 978-3-319-55136-4)
Publisher Palgrave Macmillan (London)
Publication status Publié
Affiliation UCL - SSH/SPLE - Institut de sciences politiques Louvain-Europe
Links
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Bibliographic reference Adriaensen, Johan ; Delreux, Tom. Conclusion. Opportunities and Challenges for the Principal–Agent Model in Studying the European Union. In: Delreux Tom & Adriaensen Johan, The Principal Agent Model and the European Union, Palgrave Macmillan  : London 2017, p. 283-299
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/188980