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Conclusion. Opportunities and Challenges for the Principal–Agent Model in Studying the European Union

Bibliographic reference Adriaensen, Johan ; Delreux, Tom. Conclusion. Opportunities and Challenges for the Principal–Agent Model in Studying the European Union. In: Delreux Tom & Adriaensen Johan, The Principal Agent Model and the European Union, Palgrave Macmillan  : London 2017, p. 283-299
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/188980
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