| Authors |
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| Document type |
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Document de travail (Working Paper) |
| Abstract |
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The paper extensively studies the static model of non-cooperative linear quadratic games in which a set of agents strategically chooses their instruments. We first derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium as well as for multiple equilibria to arise. Furthermore, we study the general condition for policy neutrality and Pareto efficiency of the equilibrium by introducing a new concept of decisiveness.
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| Access type |
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Accès libre
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| Publication date |
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2009 |
| Language |
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Anglais |
| Number of pages |
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15 pages |
| Collection |
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Working Paper of the department of communication of University of Teramo - 59 |
| Affiliations |
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UCL
- ESPO/ECON - Département des sciences économiques
University of Teramo
- Faculty of communication
Sapienza University of Rome
- Departement of Geo-economics
UCL
- EUEN/CORE - Center for operations research and econometrics
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| Keywords |
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Conflict of Interest ; Nash equilibrium existence ; Multiplicity ; Policy invariance ; Controllability ; Pareto efficiency
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| Links |
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