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On Optimality of Search Matching Equilibrium when Workers are Risk Averse

Bibliographic reference Lehmann, Etienne ; Van der Linden, Bruno. On Optimality of Search Matching Equilibrium when Workers are Risk Averse. In: Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol. 9, no. 5, p. 867-884 (October 2007)
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