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The impact of the unilateral EU commitment on the stability of international climate agreements

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Document type : Article de périodique (Journal article) – Article de recherche
Abstract :

The negotiation strategy of the European Union was analysed with respect to the formation of an international climate agreement of the post-2012 area. Game theory was employed to explore the incentives for key players in the climate policy arena to join future climate agreements. A - 20% unilateral commitment strategy by the EU was compared with a multilateral - 30% emission reduction strategy for all Annex-B countries. Using a numerical integrated assessment climate-economy simulation model, we fond that leakage, in the sense of strategic policy reactions on emissions, was negligible. The EU strategy to reduce emissions by 30% (compared with 1990 levels) by 2020, if other Annex-B countries follow suit, does not induce the participation of the USA with a comparable reduction commitment. However, we argue that the original EU proposal can be reshaped so as to stabilize a larger and more ambitious climate coalition than the Kyoto Protocol in its first commitment period.
Publication date : 2010
Language : Anglais
Journal information : "Climate Policy" - Vol. 10, no. 2, p. 148-166 (2010)
Peer reviewed : yes
Publisher : Earthscan Ltd. ((United Kingdom) London)
issn : 1469-3062
e-issn : 1752-7457
Publication status : Publié
Affiliations : UCL - SSH/IMMAQ - Institut de recherche multidisciplinaire pour la modélisation et l'analyse quantitative
UCL - SST/ELI/ELIC - Earth & Climate
UCL - ESPO/ESPO - Faculté des sciences économiques, sociales, politiques et de communication
Keywords : Emissions trading ; Game theory ; Integrated assessment ; International climate policy ; 1443 ; 1443
Links :
Bibliographic reference Bréchet, Thierry ; Eyckmans, J. ; Gerard, Fr. ; Marbaix, Philippe ; Tulkens, Henry ; et. al. The impact of the unilateral EU commitment on the stability of international climate agreements. In: Climate Policy, Vol. 10, no. 2, p. 148-166 (2010)
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/89960

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