User menu

Accès à distance ? S'identifier sur le proxy UCLouvain | Saint-Louis

Hospital’s activity-based financing system and manager: physician interaction

  • Open access
  • PDF
  • 296.58 K
  1. Amir Rabah, Endogenous Timing in Two-Player Games: A Counterexample, 10.1006/game.1995.1018
  2. Boadway Robin, Marchand Maurice, Sato Motohiro, An optimal contract approach to hospital financing, 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2003.08.001
  3. Chalkley Martin, Malcomson James M., Contracting for Health Services with Unmonitored Quality, 10.1111/1468-0297.00331
  4. Crainich David, Leleu Hervé, Mauleon Ana, The optimality of hospital financing system: the role of physician–manager interactions, 10.1007/s10754-008-9039-x
  5. Crilly Tessa, Le Grand Julian, The motivation and behaviour of hospital Trusts, 10.1016/s0277-9536(03)00399-x
  6. Custer William S., Moser James W., Musacchio Robert A., Willke Richard J., The production of health care services and changing hospital reimbursement, 10.1016/0167-6296(90)90016-v
  7. Hospital funding and competition, 10.1007/s10198-004-0230-9
  8. Dor Avi, Watson Harry, The hospital-physician interaction in U.S. hospitals: Evolving payment schemes and their incentives, 10.1016/0014-2921(94)00087-g
  9. Ellis Randall P., Creaming, skimping and dumping: provider competition on the intensive and extensive margins, 10.1016/s0167-6296(97)00042-8
  10. Ellis Randall P., McGuire Thomas G., Provider behavior under prospective reimbursement, 10.1016/0167-6296(86)90002-0
  11. Hamilton Jonathan H, Slutsky Steven M, Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria, 10.1016/0899-8256(90)90012-j
  12. Harris Jeffrey E., The Internal Organization of Hospitals: Some Economic Implications, 10.2307/3003297
  13. Ma Ching-to Albert, Health Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives, 10.1111/j.1430-9134.1994.00093.x
  14. McGuire A., The theory of the hospital: A review of the models, 10.1016/0277-9536(85)90195-9
  15. McPake, B., Normand, C.: Health Economics: An International Perspective. second edition, Routledge (2008)
  16. Mougeot Michel, Naegelen Florence, Hospital price regulation and expenditure cap policy, 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2004.04.007
  17. Newhouse, J.P.: Towards a theory of non-profit institutions: an economic model of a hospital. Am. Econ. Rev. 60, 87–92 (1970)
  18. Newhouse, J.P.: Reimbursing health plans and health providers : selection versus efficiency in production. J. Econ. Lit. 34, 1236–1263 (1996)
  19. Pauly, M.V., Redish, M.: The not-for-profit hospital as a physicians’ cooperative. Am. Econ. Rev. 63, 87–99 (1973)
  20. Pope Gregory C., Using hospital-specific costs to improve the fairness of prospective reimbursement, 10.1016/0167-6296(90)90045-5
  21. Singh Nirvikar, Vives Xavier, Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly, 10.2307/2555525
  22. van de Ven Wynand P.M.M., Regulated competition in health care: With or without a global budget?, 10.1016/0014-2921(94)00086-f
  23. Vives, X.: Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools. The MIT Press, Cambridge (1999)
  24. Willke, R.J., Custer, W.S., Moser, J.W., Musacchio, R.A.: Collaborative production and resource allocation: the consequences of prospective payment for hospital care. Q. Rev. Econ. Bus. 31(1), 28–47 (1991)
Bibliographic reference Crainich, David ; Leleu, Hervé ; Mauleon, Ana. Hospital’s activity-based financing system and manager: physician interaction. In: The European Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 12, no. 5, p. 417-427 (2011)
Permanent URL