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How agents weaken their principals’ incentives to control: the case of EU negotiators and EU member states in multilateral negotiations

Bibliographic reference Delreux, Tom ; Kerremans, Bart. How agents weaken their principals’ incentives to control: the case of EU negotiators and EU member states in multilateral negotiations. In: Journal of European Integration, Vol. 32, no. 4, p. 357-374 (2010)
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