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Note on Nash equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information

Bibliographic reference Forges, F.. Note on Nash equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information. In: International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 13, no. 3, p. 179-187 (1984)
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/66417
  1. Aumann, R.J., M. Maschler, andR.E. Steams: Repeated Games of Incomplete Information: An Approach to the Non-Zero-Sum Case, The Indirect Measurement of Utility, Chap.IV, Report to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Contract S.T. 143, prepared by Mathematica, Inc., Princeton 1968, 117–216.
  2. Aumann, R.J., andS. Hart: Bi-Convexity and Bi-Martingales. Preprint, 1983.
  3. Forges, F.: A First Study of Correlated Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information. CORE Discussion Paper 8218, Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, 1982.
  4. Hart, S.: Non-Zero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete information. CORE Discussion Paper 8203, Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, 1982.