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Correlated equilibria in repeated games with lack of information on one side: A model with verifiable types

Bibliographic reference Forges, F.. Correlated equilibria in repeated games with lack of information on one side: A model with verifiable types. In: International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 15, no. 2, p. 65-82 (1986)
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/66387
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