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Linear inequality methods to enforce partnerships under uncertainty : an overview

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d'Aspremont-Lynden, Claude [UCL] Gerard-Varet, LA

We review different (generic) conditions on stochastic outcome functions to enforce either efficient or nearly efficient partnerships. Their logical relationship is explored. Two kinds of conditions are considered. However, the property for an action profile to be "compatible" plays a crucial role in both kinds. Also, two kinds of enforcement mechanisms are considered: enforcement through utility transfers and enforcement through repetition.

Document type Communication à un colloque (Conference Paper) – Présentation orale avec comité de sélection
Access type Accès restreint
Publication date 1998
Language Anglais
Conference "Francqui Colloquium on Social Organization and Mechanism Design", BRUSSELS(Belgium) (Jun 10-11, 1996)
Journal information "Games and Economic Behavior" - Vol. 25, no. 2, p. 311-336 (1998)
Peer reviewed yes
issn 0899-8256
e-issn 1090-2473
Publisher Academic Press Inc (San Diego)
Affiliation UCL - Autre
Keywords Mechanism Design ; Partnership ; Team Moral Hazard ; Folk Theorem
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Bibliographic reference d'Aspremont-Lynden, Claude ; Gerard-Varet, LA. Linear inequality methods to enforce partnerships under uncertainty : an overview.Francqui Colloquium on Social Organization and Mechanism Design (BRUSSELS(Belgium), Jun 10-11, 1996). In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 25, no. 2, p. 311-336 (1998)
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/62596