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Optimal Monitoring in Teams.

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Gautier, Axel

We abstract from risk sharing. The limited liability constraint and the non contractibility of the created surplus (see after) implies that it is not possible to make an agent residual claimant of the relation. Then, even with risk neutral agents, the inc

Document type Document de travail (Working Paper)
Access type Accès libre
Publication date 1999
Collection ECON Working Papers - 1999/06
Affiliation UCL - ESPO/ECON - Département des sciences économiques
Keywords Team ; Principal agent ; Monitoring
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Bibliographic reference Gautier, Axel. Optimal Monitoring in Teams.. ECON Working Papers ; 1999/06 (1999)
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/5519