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Sub-core Solutions of the Problem of Strong Implementation

Bibliographic reference Holzman, R.. Sub-core Solutions of the Problem of Strong Implementation. In: International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 16, no. 4, p. 263-289 (1987)
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/53423
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