User menu

Ordinal Bayesian Incentive Compatible Representations of Committees

Bibliographic reference d'Aspremont-Lynden, Claude ; Peleg, B.. Ordinal Bayesian Incentive Compatible Representations of Committees. In: Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 5, no. 4, p. 261-279 (1988)
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/53384
  1. d'Aspremont C, Gérard-Varet L-A (1979) Incentives and incomplete information. J Publ Econ 11: 25?45
  2. d'Aspremont C, Gérard-Varet L-A (1982) Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs. J Math Econ 10: 83?103
  3. Barbera S (1979) Majority and positional voting in a probabilistic framework. Rev Econ Stud 46: 379?389
  4. Dasgupta P, Hammond P, Maskin E (1979) The implementation of social choice rules: some general results on incentive compatibility. Rev Econ Stud 46: 185?216
  5. Gibbard A (1977) Manipulation of schemes that mix voting with chance. Econometrica 45: 665?681
  6. Hanoch G, Levy H (1969) The efficiency analysis of choices involving risk. Rev Econ Stud 36: 335?346
  7. Harsanyi JC (1967?68) Games with incomplete information played by ?Bayesian? players, parts I?III. Manag Sci 14: 158?182; 320?334; 486?502
  8. Holzman R (1986) On strong representations of games by social choice functions. J Math Econ 15: 39?57
  9. Hylland A (1980) Strategy proofness of voting procedures with lotteries as outcomes and infinite sets of strategies. University of Oslo, Institute of Economics
  10. Mertens J-F, Zamir S (1985) Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information. Int J Game Theory 14: 1?29
  11. Myerson RB (1985) Bayesian equilibrium and incentive-compatibility: an introduction. In: Social goals and social organization. Essays in memory of Elisha Pazner. Hurwicz L, Schmeidler D, Sonnenschein H (eds) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
  12. Pattanaik PK (1978) Strategy and group choice. North-Holland, Amsterdam
  13. Peleg Bezalel, Game Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees, ISBN:9781139052283, 10.1017/ccol0521259649
  14. Schofield Norman James, Social Choice and Democracy, ISBN:9783642705984, 10.1007/978-3-642-70596-0