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Equilibria in Multiparty Competition Under Uncertainty

Bibliographic reference Depalma, A. ; Hong, GS. ; Thisse, Jacques-François. Equilibria in Multiparty Competition Under Uncertainty. In: Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 7, no. 3, p. 247-259 (1990)
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/52037
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