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5 Legitimate Definitions of Correlated Equilibrium in Games With Incomplete Information

Bibliographic reference Forges, F.. 5 Legitimate Definitions of Correlated Equilibrium in Games With Incomplete Information. In: Theory and Decision : an international journal for multidisciplinary advances in decision sciences, Vol. 35, no. 3, p. 277-310 (1993)
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