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On the Logic of Common Belief and Common Knowledge

Bibliographic reference Lismont, L. ; Mongin, Philippe. On the Logic of Common Belief and Common Knowledge. In: Theory and Decision : an international journal for multidisciplinary advances in decision sciences, Vol. 37, no. 1, p. 75-106 (1994)
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/49269
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