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Relative utilitarianism

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Dhillon, A Mertens, Jean-François [UCL]

In a framework of preferences over lotteries, we show that an axiom system consisting of weakened versions of Arrow's axioms has a unique solution. "Relative Utilitarianism" consists of first normalizing individual von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities between 0 and 1 and then summing them.

Document type Article de périodique (Journal article) – Article de recherche
Access type Accès restreint
Publication date 1999
Language Anglais
Journal information "Econometrica" - Vol. 67, no. 3, p. 471-498 (1999)
Peer reviewed yes
Publisher Blackwell Publ Ltd (Oxford)
issn 0012-9682
e-issn 1468-0262
Publication status Publié
Affiliation UCL
Keywords axiomatization ; social change ; social welfare function ; utilitarianism ; welfarism ; Arrow's Impossibility Theorem ; expected utility
Links
Bibliographic reference Dhillon, A ; Mertens, Jean-François. Relative utilitarianism. In: Econometrica, Vol. 67, no. 3, p. 471-498 (1999)
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/44487