De Sinopoli, F
In this paper we prove that for generic (noncooperative) voting games under plurality rule the set of equilibria that induce a mixed distribution over the outcomes (i.e., with two or more candidates elected with positive probability) is finite and, furthermore, each of these equilibria is regular. From that we deduce the finiteness of the set of equilibrium distributions over outcomes. Furthermore we offer an example (S. Govindan and A. McLennan, 1997, "On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Game Forms," mimeo) that shows the impossibility of extending such results to a general framework, even just to voting games. Classification Numbers: C72, D72. (C) 2001 Academic Press.
Bibliographic reference |
De Sinopoli, F. On the generic finiteness of equilibrium outcomes in plurality games. In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 34, no. 2, p. 270-286 (2001) |
Permanent URL |
http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/43084 |