De Sinopoli, Francesco
In this note we discuss two examples of appoval voting games. The first one, with six voters and three candidates, has a unique stable set,where each voter approves only his most preferred candidate. This strategy coincides with the sophisticated one, while other strategy combinations, leading to different outcomes, are selected by the perfect equilibrium concept. Moreover, this example shows that sophisticated voting, as well as strategic stability, does not imply the election of a Condorcet winner, even if it exists. The second example, with four voters and four candidates, shows that strategic stability does not exclude non sincere strategies. Furthermore, the same results hold in complete neighborhoods of the games considered.
Bibliographic reference |
De Sinopoli, Francesco. Two examples of strategic equilibria in approval voting games. CORE Discussion Papers ; 1999/31 (1999) |
Permanent URL |
http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/4043 |