Repeated games played by cryptographically sophisticated players

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Authors	:	Gossner, Olivier
Document type	:	Document de travail (Working Paper)
Abstract	:	We explore the consequences of the assumptions used in modern cryptography when applied to repeated games with public communication. Technically speaking, we model agents by polynomial Turing machines and assume the existence of a trapdoor function. Under these conditions, we prove a Folk Theorem in which the minmax level of players has to be taken in correlated strategies instead of mixed strategies.
Access type	:	Accès libre
Publication date	:	1998
Collection	:	CORE Discussion Papers - 1998/35
Affiliation	:	UCL - CORE - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics
Keywords	:	Repeated games ; Bounded rationality ; Correlation ; Turing machines ; Cryptography
Links	:	http://www.core.ucl.ac.be/services/psfiles/dp98/dp9835.pdf [Handle]http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/3942

Bibliographic reference	Gossner, Olivier. Repeated games played by cryptographically sophisticated players. CORE Discussion Papers ; 1998/35 (1998)
Permanent URL	http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/3942