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Financial intermediaries, ownership structure and the provision of venture capital to SMEs: evidence from Japan

Bibliographic reference Cumming, Douglas ; Fleming, Grant ; Schwienbacher, Armin. Financial intermediaries, ownership structure and the provision of venture capital to SMEs: evidence from Japan. In: Small Business Economics : an entrepreneurship journal, Vol. 31, no. 1, p. 59-92 (2008)
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