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Competitive Markets for Pollution Permits: Impact on Factor Income and International Equilibrium

Bibliographic reference Jouvet, Pierre-Andre ; Michel, Philippe ; Rotillon, Gilles. Competitive Markets for Pollution Permits: Impact on Factor Income and International Equilibrium. In: Environmental Modeling & Assessment, Vol. 15, no. 1, p. 1-11 (2010)
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