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Government outsourcing: public contracting with private monopoly

Bibliographic reference Auriol, Emmanuelle ; Picard, Pierre. Government outsourcing: public contracting with private monopoly. In: The Economic Journal, Vol. 119, no. 540, p. 1464-1493 (Octobre 2009)
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/28997
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