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Growth and distribution in an AK-model with endogenous impatience

Bibliographic reference Borissov, Kirill ; Lambrecht, Stéphane. Growth and distribution in an AK-model with endogenous impatience. In: Economic Theory, Vol. 39, no. 1, p. 93-112 (Avril 2009)
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