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Continuity in mechanism design without transfers

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Martimort, David [University of Toulouse] Semenov, Aggey [UCL]

We adopt a mechanism design approach to model communication between a principal and a privately informed agent in the context where monetary incentives are not available. We provide a simple condition on the distribution of the agent's type which ensures that the optimal mechanism is continuous. With strict log-concavity of the distribution, there exists a unique optimal mechanism that is characterized.

Document type Article de périodique (Journal article)
Publication date 2006
Language Anglais
Journal information "Economics Letters" - Vol. 93, no. 2, p. 182-189 (Novembre 2006)
Peer reviewed yes
Publisher Elsevier BV (Amsterdam, Netherlands)
issn 0165-1765
Publication status Publié
Affiliations University of Toulouse - GREMAQ
UCL - EUEN/CORE - Center for operations research and econometrics
Keywords Communication ; Mechanism design without transfers
Links
Bibliographic reference Martimort, David ; Semenov, Aggey. Continuity in mechanism design without transfers. In: Economics Letters, Vol. 93, no. 2, p. 182-189 (Novembre 2006)
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/23744