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Social Insurance and Redistribution with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

Bibliographic reference Boadway, Robin ; Leite-Monteiro, Manuel ; Marchand, Maurice ; Pestieau, Pierre. Social Insurance and Redistribution with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection. In: Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 108, no. 2, p. 279-298 (Juillet 2006)
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/23606
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