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Growth, public investment and corruption with failing institutions

Bibliographic reference de la Croix, David ; Delavallade, Clara. Growth, public investment and corruption with failing institutions. In: Economics of Governance, Vol. 10, no. 3, p. 187-219 (Juillet 2009)
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