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Help the low skilled or let the hardworking thrive? A study of fairness in optimal income taxation

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Fleurbaey, Marc [University Paris] Maniquet, François [UCL]

In a model where agents have unequal wages and heterogeneous preferences, we study the optimal redistribution via an income tax, when the social objective is based on a combination of efficiency and fairness principles, and when incentive issues are taken into account. We show how some fairness principles entail specific features for the optimal taxes, such as progressivity or tax exemption for incomes below the minimum wage.

Document type Article de périodique (Journal article)
Publication date 2007
Language Anglais
Journal information "Journal of Public Economic Theory" - Vol. 9, no. 3, p. 467-500 (Juin 2007)
Peer reviewed yes
Publisher Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc. (Malden, USA)
issn 1097-3923
Publication status Publié
Affiliations University Paris - CNRS
UCL - EUEN/CORE - Center for operations research and econometrics
Links
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Bibliographic reference Fleurbaey, Marc ; Maniquet, François. Help the low skilled or let the hardworking thrive? A study of fairness in optimal income taxation. In: Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol. 9, no. 3, p. 467-500 (Juin 2007)
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/23400