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A characterization of stochastically stable networks

Bibliographic reference Tercieux, Olivier ; Vannetelbosch, Vincent. A characterization of stochastically stable networks. In: International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 34, no. 3, p. 351-369 (Octobre 2006)
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