Maniquet, François
[UCL]
In this comment on John Roemer’s “theory of cooperation with an application to market socialism”, I extend Roemer’s first welfare theorem of market socialism in two directions. First, I prove a version of the theorem that deals with non-linear taxation. Second, I offer a connection between the theorem and welfare equality. I then argue that the models and questions that Roemer contribute to bring to welfare economics raise questions that go much beyond the research on socialist ethics. In particular, I introduce a positive model of moral behavior that yields different predictions from Roemer’s Kantian model. I conclude that individual morality should become a central concern of welfare economists.
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Bibliographic reference |
Maniquet, François. Comments on John Roemer’s first welfare theorem of market socialism*. In: Review of Social Economy, Vol. 77, no.1, p. 56-68 (2019) |
Permanent URL |
http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/218210 |