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Implementing Trojan-Resilient Hardware from(Mostly) Untrusted Components Designed by Colluding Manufacturers

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Bibliographic reference Bronchain, Olivier ; Dassy, Louis ; Faust, Sebastian ; Standaert, François-Xavier. Implementing Trojan-Resilient Hardware from(Mostly) Untrusted Components Designed by Colluding Manufacturers.2018 Workshop on Attacks and Solutions in Hardware Security (ASHES@CCS 2018) (Toronto (Canada), 19/10/2018). In: Proceedings of the 2018 Workshop on Attacks and Solutions in Hardware Security (ASHES@CCS 2018), Chip-Hong Chip, Ulrich Rührmair, Daniel Holcomb, Jorge Guajardo2018, p.1-10
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/210728