| Authors |
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| Document type |
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Document de travail (Working Paper) |
| Abstract |
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We develop a theoretical framework that allows us to study which bilateral links and coalition
structures are going to emerge at equilibrium. We define the notion of coalitional network to
represent a network and a coalition structure, where the network specifies the nature of the
relationship each individual has with his coalition members and with individuals outside his
coalition. To predict the coalitional networks that are going to emerge at equilibrium we
propose the concept of contractual stability which requires that any change made to the
coalitional network needs the consent of both the deviating players and their original coalition
partners. We show that there always exists a contractually stable coalitional network under the
simple majority decision rule and the component-wise egalitarian or majoritarian allocation
rules. Moreover, requiring the consent of group members may help to reconcile stability and
efficiency. |
| Access type |
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Accès libre
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| Publication date |
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2008 |
| Language |
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Anglais |
| Number of pages |
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24 pages |
| Collection |
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CORE Discussion Papers - 2008/66, CEREC Working Paper - 2008/09, FEEM Nota di lavoro - 2009.47 |
| Affiliations |
: |
UCL
- EUEN/CORE - Center for operations research and econometrics
UCL
- ESPO/ECON - Département des sciences économiques
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| Keywords |
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Networks ; Coalition structures ; Contractual stability ; Allocation rules
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| Links |
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