Laloux, Thomas
[UCL]
Delreux, Tom
[UCL]
This article presents a newly developed ‘deviation index’ to measure, in a quantitative and standardized way, the extent to which the negotiators in trilogues (the rapporteur and the rotating Presidency) deviate from the instructions of the institutions they represent (respectively, the EP and the Council). Based on text-mining techniques, the index is applied to the entire set of trilogue decision-making processes in the 2012–2016 period (N = 111). The article then presents three examples of how the index can generate new insights about legislative policy-making in the EU. These empirical applications show that agents deviate more than minimally required to reach an inter-institutional compromise; that rapporteurs deviate in general more than Presidencies do; and that deviation is not affected by the support for the mandate or by the size of the agent.
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Bibliographic reference |
Laloux, Thomas ; Delreux, Tom. How much do agents in trilogues deviate from their principals’ instructions? Introducing a deviation index. In: Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 25, no. 7, p. 1067 (2018) |
Permanent URL |
http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/198655 |