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Introduction. Use and limitations of the principal-agent model in studying the European Union

Bibliographic reference Delreux, Tom ; Adriaensen, Johan. Introduction. Use and limitations of the principal-agent model in studying the European Union. In: Delreux Tom & Adriaensen Johan, The Principal Agent Model and the European Union, Palgrave Macmillan  : London 2017, p. 1-34
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/188979
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