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Equilibrium Leadership in Tax Competition Models with Capital Ownership : A Rejoinder

Bibliographic reference Hindriks, Jean ; Nishimura, Yukihiro. Equilibrium Leadership in Tax Competition Models with Capital Ownership : A Rejoinder. In: International Tax and Public Finance, Vol. 24, no. 2, p. 338-349 (April 2017)
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/176428
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