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Estimating the supply chain efficiency loss when the seller has to estimate the buyer’s willingness to pay

Bibliographic reference Brusset, Xavier. Estimating the supply chain efficiency loss when the seller has to estimate the buyer’s willingness to pay. In: RAIRO - Operations Research, Vol. 48, no.4, p. 477-496 (2014)
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