User menu

Accès à distance ? S'identifier sur le proxy UCLouvain | Saint-Louis

Network Formation Games

Primary tabs

Mauleon, Ana [FUSL] Vannetelbosch, Vincent [UCL]

In many economic networks, the network is not exogenous but instead agents decide what links they want to build. A central question is predicting the networks that agents will form. This chapter presents myopic and farsighted concepts for modeling network formation when the formation of a link requires the consent of both agents. The chapter illustrates the bites that these solution concepts have on economic applications and investigates whether the networks formed by farsighted agents are efficient and different from those formed by myopic agents. Three models of network formation are analyzed: networks of R&D collaborations, networks of free trade agreements, and criminal networks. It is shown that, depending on the application, myopia and farsightedness may lead to divergent predictions, and farsightedness can help to support the emergence of efficient networks.

Document type Contribution à ouvrage collectif (Book Chapter) – Chapitre
Publication date 2016
Language Anglais
Host document Y. Bramoullé, A. Galeotti and B.W. Rogers ; "The Oxford Handbook on the Economics of Networks"- 167-190 (ISBN : 978-0-19-994827-7)
Publisher Oxford University Press (Oxford, U.K.)
Publication status Publié
Affiliations UCL - SSH/LIDAM/CORE - Center for operations research and econometrics
USL-B - Centre de recherche en Economie (CEREC)
USL-B - Autre
Keywords Stability ; efficiency ; myopia ; farsightedness
Links
Bibliographic reference Mauleon, Ana ; Vannetelbosch, Vincent. Network Formation Games. In: Y. Bramoullé, A. Galeotti and B.W. Rogers, The Oxford Handbook on the Economics of Networks, Oxford University Press  : Oxford, U.K. 2016, p.167-190
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.3/167319