User menu

Thematic clubs and the supremacy of network externalities

Bibliographic reference Amir, Rabah ; Resende, Joana ; Jaskold Gabszewicz, Jean. Thematic clubs and the supremacy of network externalities. In: Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol. 16, no. 5, p. 706-729 (2014)
Permanent URL
  1. Akerlof George A., Social Distance and Social Decisions, 10.2307/2171877
  2. Allouch Nizar, Wooders Myrna, Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes, 10.1016/j.jet.2007.07.006
  3. Amir Rabah, Supermodularity and Complementarity in Economics: An Elementary Survey, 10.2307/20062066
  4. Amir Rabah, Lazzati Natalia, Network effects, market structure and industry performance, 10.1016/j.jet.2011.10.006
  5. Armstrong Mark, Wright Julian, Two-sided Markets, Competitive Bottlenecks and Exclusive Contracts, 10.1007/s00199-006-0114-6
  6. Arthur W. Brian, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events, 10.2307/2234208
  7. BOWLES, Microeconomics: Behavior, Institutions and Evolution (2004)
  8. Buchanan James M., An Economic Theory of Clubs, 10.2307/2552442
  9. Cabral Luís, Dynamic Price Competition with Network Effects, 10.1093/restud/rdq007
  10. DOGANOGLU, Netnomics, 5, 16 (2003)
  11. FARRELL, Handbook of Industrial Organization, 1967 (2007)
  12. Farrell Joseph, Saloner Garth, Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, 10.2307/2555589
  13. Furhoff Lars, Some reflections on newspaper concentration, 10.1080/03585522.1973.10407743
  14. Gabszewicz J.J., Garella P.G., Sonnac N., Newspapers’ market shares and the theory of the circulation spiral, 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2007.06.002
  15. GABSZEWICZ , J. J. X. WAUTHY 2004 Two-sided markets and price competition with multi-homing
  16. Griva Krina, Vettas Nikolaos, Price competition in a differentiated products duopoly under network effects, 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2010.08.002
  17. HALMOS, Measure Theory (1974)
  18. Hammond Peter J, Kaneko Mamoru, Wooders Myrna Holtz, Continuum economies with finite coalitions: Core, equilibria, and widespread externalities, 10.1016/0022-0531(89)90070-7
  19. Kaneko Mamoru, Wooders Myrna Holtz, The core of a game with a continuum of players and finite coalitions: The model and some results, 10.1016/0165-4896(86)90032-6
  20. KATZ, American Economic Review, 75, 424 (1985)
  21. Konishi Hideo, Le Breton Michel, Weber Shlomo, Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in a Group Formation Game with Positive Externalities, 10.1006/game.1997.0542
  22. Laussel Didier, de Montmarin Maxime, Van Long Ngo, Dynamic duopoly with congestion effects, 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2004.02.001
  23. Matsuyama Kiminori, Explaining Diversity: Symmetry-Breaking in Complementarity Games, 10.1257/000282802320189339
  24. Resende Joana, The Economic Advantage of Being the “Voice of the Majority”, 10.1080/08997760802300639
  25. Rochet Jean-Charles, Tirole Jean, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 10.1162/154247603322493212
  26. Rohlfs Jeffrey, A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a Communications Service, 10.2307/3003090
  27. Schmeidler David, Equilibrium points of nonatomic games, 10.1007/bf01014905
  28. Wooders Myrna, The Tiebout Hypothesis: Near Optimality in Local Public Good Economies, 10.2307/1912819