Employment Subsidies and Substitutable Skills: An Equilibrium Matching Approach

The search-matching model is well suited for an equilibrium evaluation of labor market policies. When those policies are targeted on some groups, the usual juxtaposition of labor markets is however a shortcoming. There is a need for a setting where workers’ productivity depends on employment levels in all markets. This paper provides such a theoretical setting. We first develop a streamlined model and then show that it can be extended to deal with interactions among various labor market and fiscal policies. Simulation results focus on the effects of employment subsidies and in-work benefits and on their interactions with the profile of unemployment benefits and with active labor market programs.

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Document type	Communication à un colloque (Conference Paper) – Présentation orale avec comité de sélection
Publication date	2007
Language	Anglais
Conference	"19th Annual conference of the European Association of Labour Economists", Oslo (du 20/09/2007 au 22/09/2007)
Affiliation	UCL - ESPO/ECON - Département des sciences économiques
Keywords	Unemployment ; Search-matching equilibrium ; Wage bargaining ; Reductions of social security contributions ; Unemployment insurance ; Labor market programs
Links	http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/153996[Handle]

See also
	[boreal:5755]	Employment subsidies and substitutable skills : An equilibrium matching approach
	[boreal:89490]	Employment Subsidies and Substitutable Skills : An Equilibrium Matching Approach