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Unions' relative concerns and strikes in wage bargaining

Bibliographic reference Mauleon, Ana ; Vannetelbosch, Vincent ; Vergari, Cecilia. Unions' relative concerns and strikes in wage bargaining. In: Bulletin of Economic Research, Vol. 66, no.4, p. 374-383 (2014)
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/152200
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