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A bargaining theory of the firm

Bibliographic reference Britz, Volker ; Herings, P. Jean-Jacques ; Predtetchinski, Arkadi. A bargaining theory of the firm. In: Economic Theory, Vol. 54, no.1, p. 45-75 (2013)
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