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Interregional redistribution through tax surcharge

Bibliographic reference Cremer, Helmuth ; Marchand, Maurice. Interregional redistribution through tax surcharge. In: International Tax and Public Finance, Vol. 3, no.2, p. 157-173 (May 1996)
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/141837
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