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Is there a Political Support for the Double Burden on Prolonged Activity ?

Bibliographic reference Casamatta, Georges ; Cremer, Helmuth ; Pestieau, Pierre. Is there a Political Support for the Double Burden on Prolonged Activity ?. In: Economics of Governance, Vol. 7, no.2, p. 143-154 (May 2006)
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