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Jointly Optimal Taxes and Enforcement Policies in Response to Tax Evasion

Bibliographic reference Pestieau, Pierre ; Possen, U.M. ; Slutsky, S.M.. Jointly Optimal Taxes and Enforcement Policies in Response to Tax Evasion. In: Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol. 6, no.2, p. 337-374 (May 2004)
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/136995
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